Dave's Advanced Jet Propulsion Laborotory

DAJPL's Gagarin Project

The Gagarin Project

DAJPL's Project Gagarin Knowledgebase

Following the failure of the phatMan rocket to produce cohesive flight with 28 engines, DAJPL were commissioned by NASRA to investigate the causes of the phatMan failure and to develop a model to ensure future stable flight of 'heavy' cluster rockets.

DAJPL's top engineers and theoreticians began work immediately in secret at the Los Alamos development centers. LFP Assessment #2214 (Project Gagarin) had begun.

Project Facts

Project History


The Gagarin Project was incepted after the failure of a 28-engine rocket.

The Gagarin I was the first NASRA rocket to utilise swept-back fin technology.

Gagarin I had a projected flight of 500-600feet and made around 350 feet following a catasrophic fin failure.

The Gagarin I was named in honour of Yuri Gagarin the (officially) first man in space.

At 19 engines, the Gagarin I was (at launch) and still is the second biggest rocket ever launched by NASRA.

Gagarin Figures


Length: 165cm Total (120cm Body)
Wet Weight: 2.5 Kg
Engines: 19 x Estes D12-5

Thrust Total: 380 ns
Average Thrust: 228 ns-1

Projected Altitude: 550 feet
Apogee Altitude: 350 feet [AltAcc]

Flight History


Gagarin I: 05/07/2002
The Gagarin I was launched from Tacolneston B following one launch abort and two failed launches (no ignition) earlier in the day.

T+0.00s Ignition
T+0.52s Lift Off
T+0.72s Clear Launch Pole
T+2.04s Fin Detaches
T+2.20s 2nd Fin Detached
T+2.28s 3rd Fin Detached
T+2.48s Last Fin Detaches
T+2.56s Downward Motion Observed
T+3.52s Nosecone Detaches
T+15.00s Touchdown

Quotations


"[the project] was the single greatest employment of NASRA's technological ability to date and proves the vital role that DAJPL plays within NASRA"
Baron B. Brockdeath, Chair of NASRA Select Committe on Development

"the fin shredding was spectacular and when the rocket came down on the launch site, I thought we were all gonners. Thank Stavros for survival and for the Gagarin I"
Dwight Readneck, Launch Crew

"the work conducted up to and during the construction of the Gagarin I will, I'm sure, continue to be of the most use in furthering rocketry at NASRA"
Dougal Douglas, Counterboy, McDonalds

"DAJPL have succeeded in furthering the cause of NASRA in this, most heroic and worthy projects"
NASRA High Command Letter of Commendation to DAJPL

When Live Flight Physics (LFP) Assessment #2214 was initially tendered by NASRA to the executive agencies to "investigate theoretically the causes of failure for heavy cluster rockets" with a clause that would allow the "possibility for future expansion of the assessment to consider a practical test of theories formed". DAJPL was awarded the tender for LFP Assessment #2214 and work began immediately.

Top scientists were seconded from DAJPL's various think tanks and research institutes and Dr Karlos Jakkal was appointed as head of the project. Dr Jakkal was, at that time, the manager of the DAJPL Aeronautics, Physics and Sowing Institute and was regarded as the all-round best choice to head such a large project.

A centre for the project was setup at DAJPL's spacious Los Alamos research facility and a "small city" of houses, offices, brothels and laborotories sprung up. During the peak of the theoretical stage, the Los Alamos base was home to a scientific/research team of over 4000 with over 2000 support and security personnel. Computer systems and IS support were provided by the then-fledgling NASRA Data Systems Division and included a state of the art Pornogramiser system costing over £2 million.

Initial investigations were centered around the MicroScud and phatMan rockets. Although both rockets failed in a complete flight, the MicroScud made cohesive flight and the later flight failure was owing to different matters than the phatMan. The aim was to build a model that would fit the observed flight events and allow extrapolation of the suitability of a design.

Although much of the work undertaken during the theoretical analysis phase of the project is still classified; what is known is that the team concluded that the disproportional increase in rocket body width and weight compared with the weight and number of engines was the cause of failure. As larger and larger rockets were being built, each additional 'ring' of engines would add a fixed 5cm to the diameter of the body whilst the number of additional engines in each ring would increase almost exponentially (exact forumla depends on the engine distribution system employed) for example 1,5,11 and so on... This would cause the very basis of rocketry flight - that the Center of Pressure (CoP) be behind (aft of) the Center of Mass (CoM) of the rocket in flight ('wet' - engines loaded) configuration.

Research and extensive consultation showed that the common way to overcome such an issue was to 'move' the CoP forward, either by removing weight from the rear or, more commonly, adding weight to the nose. Although this method is well tried and tested, DAJPL felt that it was unsuitable for NASRA as analysis showed no NASRA rockets that had expendable weight at the rear, whilst adding weight would negatively affect flight performance.

DAJPL presented their findings to NASRA High Command and, in addition to explaining that weighting the nose would solve this issue for future flights, it would be better to move the CoP backward by extending the find behind the main rocket body.

NASRA High Command almost immediately instructed DAJPL to proceed in the experimental project to build a rocket to test the idea of moving the CoP backward. This marks the beginning of the second phase of the project; bringing the theory into reality and building the Gagarin I.

DAJPL began design for the Gagarin I immediately, draftsmen and engineers were flown in to join the, until now, purely theoretical community at Los Alamos. In the design of the Gagarin I, DAJPL were to utilise two new technologies. It was found that with swept-back fins, the drag would be too great for surface mated or even body-mounted fins and the decision was made to utilise a new type of 'interlocking' two-piece fins. This system involves two fin sets, each having fins joined together and the two sections designed to lock together above the engine module.

The Gagarin I is a 19 engine system which, without the swept back fins, would not fly. This design was set to test the skills of the construction team to the maximum during the hectic construction of the rocket.

Construction of the Gagarin I was performed at Construction Yard 47 by engineers from DAJPL with the heavy engineering being performed by teams from Construction Yard 34. Construction was performed modularly and the first complete assembly of the Gagarin I was made on the morning of launch. There was some astonishment that it even fitted together.

On 5th July 2002, the Gagarin I was fired from Tacolneston B. The rocket achieved it's aim and made cohesive flight. Unfortunately, a fin failure resulted in a catastrophic flight event at T+2 seconds. The Gagarin I (stripped of all 4 fins) touched down at T+15 seconds, recovery systems having deployed successfully. The AltAcc flight data package was recovered.

DAJPL have published two NASRA Technical Documents about the Gagarin I:
- The Gagarin Technical Draft Document
- Gagarin I Prelinary Post-Launch Analysis

Work on the Gagarin I continues to this day and the latest plans call for a shortening of body the fins and body to enhance flight performance.


© Copyright 2001-03 Norfolk and Suffolk Rocketry Association [ www.nasra.org.uk ]. Hosting by Verrotech Industries UK.
By accessing this site, you are agreeing to our standard Terms and Conditions. Please read our Disclaimer which applies to all NASRA Content.